Critical Unauthorized Access to Admin Pages via Vulnerable Endpoints – A Bug Bounty Case Study

About Me

Hey! I’m Satyam Pawale, known as @hackersatty in the bug bounty and ethical hacking world. I started bug hunting in 2024, and ever since, I’ve been obsessed with finding vulnerabilities that most people overlook.

My goal with this blog is to share real-world bug bounty experiences so other hunters can learn the techniques, tools, and mindset required to succeed — while staying ethical and responsible.

This case is about how I found critical admin endpoint vulnerabilities that allowed direct, unauthorized access to sensitive backend pages and data.

PAID ACCESS

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Introduction – Why Admin Endpoints Are the Holy Grail for Hackers

In any web application, admin panels are like the control center — the place where the most sensitive operations happen:

• User account management

• Database queries

• Application settings

• Internal reporting tools

If attackers gain access to these pages without authentication, it’s game over for the application’s confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Unfortunately, many organizations still expose these vulnerable endpoints to the public — sometimes unintentionally, sometimes through oversight in staging or legacy code.

In this case study, you’ll see exactly how :

• Found a subdomain with unprotected admin endpoints.

• Used OSINT and Google Dorks to locate hidden pages.

• Manipulated parameters to extract sensitive information.

• Reported the bug with proof of impact.

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Step 1 – Recon: Finding the Target Subdomain

Recon is 80% of bug bounty hunting. If you skip it or rush through, you miss opportunities.

I started by identifying subdomains for the target using tools like:

• Subfinder – For passive subdomain enumeration.

• Amass – For deep reconnaissance.

• crt.sh – Certificate transparency logs.

One subdomain caught my eye:

It wasn’t the main production domain, but it looked like a management interface.

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Step 2 – Using Google Dorks to Find Entry Points

Google Dorks are an incredibly powerful way to find publicly exposed sensitive pages. Some of my favorites for admin discovery include:

Here’s what I did:

1. Locate Login/Admin Pages:
   Found references to /TARGETED_QUICK_SEARCH_LIST and /STANDARD_QUERY_PAGE.

2. Identify JavaScript Files:
   Using site:example.com filetype:js, I found multiple scripts containing API endpoint URLs.

3. Directory Enumeration:
   Discovered /SCHEMA_BROWSE_POPUP endpoints from old code references.

These dorks worked because developers often hardcode endpoint paths in JavaScript or leave them accessible for internal testing — forgetting to restrict them later.

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Step 3 – Vulnerable Endpoints Identified

I discovered three critical endpoints that lacked authentication:

1. TARGETED_QUICK_SEARCH_LIST

URL:

Risk:

• Exposed template pages and internal metadata.

• Allowed attackers to map system structure for future exploitation.

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2. SCHEMA_BROWSE_POPUP

URL:

Risk:

• Allowed manipulation of query parameters.

• Potential to view and alter database schema.

• Risk of unauthorized data insertion or modification.

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3. STANDARD_QUERY_PAGE

URL:

Risk:

• Let attackers retrieve internal sensitive data.

• Could be exploited to dump system records.

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Step 4 – Exploiting the Vulnerabilities (Ethically)

My approach was safe and non-destructive. Here’s how I tested without harming the system:

1. Access the Endpoints:
   I directly navigated to each URL in my browser and observed responses.

2. Parameter Manipulation:
   Tested parameters like:

   &whereClause=1=1
&SearchQueryFormat=json
&fieldName=id


3. Observed Responses:

   • Sensitive metadata returned.

   • Database field names exposed.

   • Some queries returned internal-only records.

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Step 5 – The Impact if Exploited by a Malicious Actor

If a real attacker had found these endpoints, they could have:

• Bypassed Access Control: Gaining admin-level privileges without logging in.

• Dumped Internal Data: Extracted customer records, internal files, or transaction logs.

• Modified Records: Inserted malicious data or deleted important records.

• Escalated Attacks: Used schema knowledge to launch SQL injection or privilege escalation attacks.

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Step 6 – Why This Happened (Root Cause)

From my analysis, the root cause was:

• Lack of Authentication: Endpoints assumed only internal staff would access them.

• Legacy Code: Older admin tools left active without security updates.

• Insufficient Security Review: No recent pentests had been done on admin modules.

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Step 7 – Recommendations to Fix the Vulnerabilities

To prevent such issues, I suggested:

• Strict Authentication: All admin endpoints must require session tokens or role-based access.

• Endpoint Whitelisting: Restrict access to admin tools by IP.

• Security in Depth: Validate input parameters and sanitize all queries.

• Regular Security Audits: Include admin modules in every pentest.

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Advanced Pro Tips for Finding Similar Bugs

1. Target Internal Functionality:
   Look for keywords in JavaScript like admin, query, schema, panel.

2. Use Parameter Fuzzing:
   Tools like FFUF or ParamSpider can uncover hidden GET/POST parameters.

3. Leverage Archive.org:
   Old versions of the site might reveal outdated admin endpoints still active.

4. Combine OSINT with Burp Suite:
   Once you find a candidate endpoint, proxy requests through Burp to manipulate and observe.

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Final Thoughts

Finding unauthorized access to admin pages is like stumbling upon the keys to a locked building — except this one controls sensitive data for thousands of users.

This case reinforced for me that:

• Even “hidden” endpoints are not safe if left online.

• Admin tools must always be behind strong authentication.

• Recon + patience = high impact bugs.

For every hunter reading this: don’t just look for obvious login pages — dig deeper for forgotten admin functions. They’re often where the gold lies.